

Timeless Truth

A fairly simple theory about the semantics of tensed discourse is obtained by combining three claims: (i) for any time t , a present-tense sentence ‘ p ’ is either true or false as uttered at t ; (ii) for any t' earlier than t , the future-tense sentence ‘It will be the case that p at t' ’ is true as uttered at t' if ‘ p ’ is true as uttered at t , false otherwise; (iii) for any t' later than t , the past-tense sentence ‘It was the case that p at t' ’ is true as uttered at t' if ‘ p ’ is true as uttered at t , false otherwise. This theory, which has been called the ‘theory of timeless truth’, is often regarded with suspicion. The doubts raised against it mainly concern its capacity to comply with indeterminism. Here, instead, it will be suggested that there is no reason to be suspicious. §1 provides some elucidations about the theory. §2 explains how a foregone objection to it can be resisted. §3 outlines a plausible sense in which (i)-(iii) are compatible with indeterminism. §4 dispels some misunderstandings that may lead to think that indeterminism is not vindicated in some important sense other than that outlined.

1 Summary

1 Preliminary clarifications

2 The Future-Possibility Argument and the distinction between truth and determinate truth

3 Future actuality

4 Objections and responses