

## Collective Dimensions of Self-Evaluation and Self-Knowledge

An idiosyncratic feature of rational agents is their capacity of forming a special kind of reflective states concerning their mental life, namely self-evaluative attitudes. Evaluating oneself is a particular way of reflection upon one's actions, intentions, beliefs and other pro-attitudes. It is a particularly interesting phenomenon as it does not only require the agent to perform mental actions at all, but also, as I will argue in this paper, suggests a certain understanding of the way agents are constituted and that it is inevitable to locate this process in a social context to which normative expectations concerning the individual's activities are inherent.

I will first explore the form of self-knowledge that is relevant for the generation of self-evaluative attitudes (e.g. shame, pride), which I will call agential, i.e. non-observational self-knowledge and which is for this reason neither reducible to theoretical (third-personal) knowledge nor to practical knowledge. Although self-knowledge so understood results from making up one's mind about certain states of affair (Moran) and is itself a kind of mental activity that necessarily includes that it proceeds from a first-personal standpoint (Hieronymi), it does not consist in a practical syllogism; and its conclusion is not a decision for action. Rather, self-knowledge seems to present us with a third kind of knowledge, that partly creates its object (namely the known attitude) by forming the self-knower's primarily implicit intentionality (i.e. inaccessible to rational as well as empirical investigation) through explicating/expressing it.

In the following, I want to advance the thesis that self-evaluation based on agential self-knowledge always takes place in an intersubjective context that provides not only the normative standards by which the evaluator judges particular aspects of her intentionality (or even the entirety of her intentional states), but also the range of possible concepts and interpretations, which the evaluator employs in describing and explaining her actions, i.e. in knowing her own mind.

I will conclude with some remarks on the appropriateness of self-evaluation and emphasise that the account of self-evaluation I propose regards it as vitally influenced by both, the evaluator and her collective environment, and therefore avoids a solipsistic as well as a socially deterministic view of agents.