When we say that a certain action is rational, we do not mean to express an assertion, whether true or false. We express a speaker's acceptance of some norms, permitting an action. Rationality can not be identified with justification or evaluation, it can be identified with a decision to accept a norm (Maher, *Betting on*, 25). Norms are prescriptions for action and they are of an objective nature. They are in the World 3 in sense of the conception of Popper. A norm regulates the behaviour of particular addresses in specific circumstances by means of imposing obligations (prohibitions) and giving rights. Following J. Wolenski, we can say that norms are introduced by performative utterances of the type of: 'I state that A is obligatory (prohibited)', which expresses a decision of certain normative authority. Norm-formulation appeals to 'the will' of this authority, but it is not devoid of rational grounds. A decision can not be reduced to its linguistic formulation only; it is an act of evolvement of normative regulation, a process of forcing an authoritative will through; the result of it is a division of all possible actions into three mutually-disjoint sets: obligatory, forbidden and indifferent. In the context of logic, "normation" spells out choice of a normative function (Wolenski, *Deontic*). The normative discourse embraces deontic propositions only – they express performative utterances and statements about norms. The promulgation of norms is based on a system of values. Rationality evaluations can be reconsidered following this pattern of interpretation. Values are constructive results of evaluations, which can be presented as decisions. They have a propositional form, too. Rationality can be interpreted as a deontic concept.

Normative decision is a choice called upon to substantiate aims of the normative authority. Scientific community is this authority in science. It enacts and guarantees the binding force of the norm of scientific rationality, doing it on the basis of knowledge, traditions, general view of science and its aims, and through giving an account of social factors and prescriptions. These norms are absolutely objective in the context of individual scientists. Their violation dooms a scientist's research to failure. But this fact does not question their statute of norms. Following analogy with laws of nature or legal laws, norms are independent of normative decisions. The agent makes decision to accept rational norms or not, because such decisions fall in with his own interpretation of science's aims, problems, instruments, methodological attitudes. The choice of a norm is determined by the interest taken in maximizing epistemic utility. A norm only defines the common framework and principles of scientific problem-solving – its application is a question of professional skills and creative attitude to the particular problem. It is of no importance if the agent's cognitive abilities do not satisfy the requirements of a norm. Such a discrepancy can be compensated by the fact that he works in a conceptual and normative framework, established by the overall scientific community. There is an invariant core in the norms of rationality, accounting for their being not so liable to change. It means that they are not so relative ones in an absolute sense. Such type of analysis can be applied also to other norms – political, social, moral and language norms.

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