

Presuppositions are preconditions on things going well with an utterance. There are two broad ways of fleshing out this idea of presuppositions as preconditions. First, one can take the presuppositions of a particular utterance to be preconditions that must be satisfied for that utterance to be *felicitous*. By this it is meant that the satisfaction of presuppositions is a necessary condition for communication to proceed smoothly. This way of thinking about presuppositions is associated with Stalnaker (1974), (2002). Call this the *felicity view* of presuppositions.

Another way of fleshing out the claim that presuppositions are preconditions on things going well with an utterance is to take presuppositions as preconditions on an utterance *expressing a proposition*. This conception was held by Frege (1892/1960) and was revived by Strawson (1950). Call this the *expression view* of presuppositions.

Heim's (1982), (1983) dynamic semantics presented a rigorous incarnation of the felicity view, which has since been the paradigmatic semantic treatment of presuppositions. This framework defines a notion of truth for individual utterances in terms of its context-change potential. This definition has the consequence that we can only evaluate a sentence for truth and falsity w.r.t. a context  $c$  and a world  $w$  if its presuppositions are satisfied in  $c$ , that is, if  $p$  is part of the common ground. But since the set of propositions in the common ground are defined as the propositions towards which the participants bear some non-factive attitude (e.g. belief, acceptance),  $p$  can be satisfied in  $c$  although false.

It is argued in this paper that for a wide range of standard types of presuppositions triggers this has counterintuitive consequences. In particular, the view predicts presupposition failure, and hence a truth value gap, in a situation where the presuppositions in question are true but not accepted, or believed, by the participants. But this is intuitively inadequate, as is easy to see considering examples.

The problem is then diagnosed as resulting from the dynamic attempt to subsume the expression view under its fundamental felicity-based approach to semantics and to presuppositions. Furthermore, I discuss whether this problem generalizes to the class of all presupposition triggers, among which many diversities have been observed. One particularly interesting example are the presuppositions triggered by the so-called *phi-features* of pronouns, i.e., gender, person and number. I show that complexities arise due to the role these presuppositions play in audiences' effort to ascertain the speaker's referential intentions.

I end with a discussion of the consequences of this for the dynamic attempt to overthrow traditional truth conditional semantics by identifying context-change potentials with linguistic meanings.

## References

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