

Abstract
A Resolution to the *Euthyphro* Dilemma

The debate on the relation of ethics to divinity goes back to Socrates' dialogue with Euthyphro. Divine command theory holds that God's commands determine the moral value of actions. This paper examines some issues surrounding this theory and the interplay between ethics and religion.

It briefly discusses three different arguments 1) scriptural, 2) metaphysical, and 3) meta-ethical, and argues that none of them are successful.

Based on these analyses, the paper rejects both horns of the *Euthyphro* dilemma. It offers a new solution to the dilemma called "a sophisticated divine command theory".

A brief summary of the theory:

Recall the dilemma revolves around the disjunction:

(A) Either right actions are right because God commands the performance of them, or God commands the performance of right actions because they are right.

Possible premises needed to derive (A) is:

(B) God commands the performance of all right actions.

(C) The correlation between an action being right and its being commanded by God is capable of explanation.

(D) The explanatory connection between an action's being right and its performance's being commanded by God is a direct connection.

There are circumstances under which (D) and therefore (A) can possibly be wrong.

This will be achieved by rejecting,

(E) The connection between the rightness of actions and God's commands is a justificatory connection.

It will be shown that there are good grounds to reject (E) and therefore to reject (A).

It argues that moral truths (if there are any) depend on divine will because human nature depends on divine will. To be precise, just as scientific laws and physical objects depend on divine will, morality also depends on divine will, not divine commands. The proposal overcomes the difficulties of traditional divine command theories.

Particularly, the sophisticated divine command theory, unlike R. M. Adams' theory, does not render the connection between the natural features of actions and moral properties as entirely mysterious. It allows moral properties of actions to supervene on their natural properties. Equally, it accommodates the intuition that if human beings were physically, biologically, and psychologically different, morality would be different too.