

Conjunctivism vs. disjunctivism as to perceptual experiences vs. emotional states

As is well known, by claiming that an intentional state of hallucination and an intentional state of perception (either genuine or illusory) are states of the same type, conjunctivism relies on the idea that phenomenologically indistinguishable experiences share something that makes them experiences of the same kind. The conjunctivist actually sticks to:

- (1) If two intentional states are phenomenologically indistinguishable, then they share both their modality and their content;
- (2) If two intentional states share both their modality and their content, then they are states of the same type.

This allows the conjunctivist to put forward the following argument in favour of her position:

- (3) There are phenomenologically indistinguishable intentional states of hallucination and of perception;
- (4) If two intentional states are phenomenologically indistinguishable, then they are states of the same type [from (1), (2)];
- (5) Therefore, there are intentional states of hallucination and intentional states of perception which are states of the same type.

Yet one may independently retort that phenomenological identity does not suffice for type-identity of intentional states, even if one is neutral about the kind of content such states have (which may even be a singular content in both cases, if one allows for nonexistent objects of hallucination). For (assuming that neutrality) type-identity follows from the *modality* of an intentional state. The modality of such a state depends on the *overall* functional role of that state, which is different in the case of a perception and of the corresponding phenomenologically indistinguishable hallucination. As a matter of fact, in the case of utterly non-qualitative intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, there is no doubt that their different modality is captured by their different overall functional states. But also in the case of partially non-qualitative intentional states, such as emotions, their different modality is primarily captured by their different functional role. We may well imagine a state of love and a state of hate (possibly about the same very individual) which are phenomenally indistinguishable and yet are different insofar as their overall functional roles are different. Since perceptual experiences have a functional role as well, the burden of the proof is on the conjunctivist to show that in their case functional role does not count for type-individuation. All in all, (1) is to be rejected. Yet if one rejects (1), (4) lacks a real support.

Curiously enough, as far as emotions are concerned, the predicament is exactly the opposite. A conjunctivist account of what emotions really are may square with a disjunctivist phenomenology about them. Despite the different behaviour that follows them, a genuine emotion, an illusory emotion and a hallucinatory emotion (a passion for something which does not exist) are *actually* states of the same kind. Nevertheless, one may well *experience* those states as states of different kind. Typically, by so doing one takes the different beliefs *externally* associated to those states respectively, which are really responsible for the aforementioned difference in behaviour, to be *internally* related to such states.

This inverse situation does not undermine a perceptualist account of emotions – like perceptions, emotions are automatic, modular, world-guided; have phenomenal properties and correctness conditions; suffer from recalcitrance – yet it suggests that, unlike perceptions, emotions are permeable to rational reconstruction. In a nutshell, self-deception may affect emotions, but not perceptions.